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THE PROBLEM
Th   e United States is running its largest external current account 
deﬁ  cit in the available historical record for nearly two centuries.1 
At an average of about 6½ percent of GDP in 2005, this deﬁ  cit 
is already almost twice as large in relative terms as its previous 
post-19th century peak of 3.4 percent in 1987. My projections 
indicate that the deﬁ  cit is on a path to reach more than 8 percent 
of GDP in 2010.2 Th  e United States has already swung from 
being the world’s largest creditor to being its largest debtor nation, 
with net external liabilities amounting to 22 percent of GDP at 
1 Th   e current account is the sum of trade in goods and services, capital income, 
and transfers. In the period 1895–1980 the US current account was typically in 
surplus, averaging about 1 percent of GDP and peaking at about 6 percent in 
1917. Th   ere were deﬁ  cits in the early 1870s and late 1880s, but these peaked at 
about 3 percent of GDP (Cline 2005, 2). In earlier decades, the deﬁ  cit peaked 
during the period of large British lending for canals and railroads, reaching a 
maximum of 5 percent of GDP in 1836. Th   e balance had been positive in the 
1820s and swung back to positive in the 1840s. In the 1850s and 1860s it turned 
negative again, but the deﬁ  cits were only in the range of 2 to 2½ percent of 
GDP. (Th   ese are rough estimates based on Maddison 2004 and US Bureau of the 
Census 1976.)
2 Th   e dollar appreciated by about 4.3 percent on a real, trade-weighted basis from 
the January-May 2005 base used in my book to its mid-November level (Federal 
Reserve, “Price-Adjusted Broad Dollar Index,” www.federalreserve.gov [accessed 
December 8, 2005]). Th   is boosts the baseline deﬁ  cit for 2010 from the original 
range of 7.3 to 8.1 percent of GDP to 8.0 to 8.7 percent.
end-2004. By 2010 net liabilities are likely to rise to about 55 
percent of GDP. 
Th   is trajectory is highly undesirable for four reasons. First, 
the long-term burden of the external adjustment will be all that 
much greater when it ﬁ  nally does come if the needed adjustment 
is larger because it is delayed. My projections indicate that, with 
the dollar at its level of January-May 2005, the baseline current 
account deﬁ  cit reaches 14 percent of GDP by 20 years from now, 
and net foreign liabilities reach 135 percent of GDP. Th  at  will 
almost certainly not happen, because some crisis would inter-
vene, forcing a cutback in the deﬁ  cit and curbing the buildup of 
external debt. To avert such a crisis, prudence strongly suggests 
that net liabilities should be held to no more than 50 percent 
of GDP.3 So the sustainable long-term current account deﬁ  cit 
is only about 3 percent of GDP.4 Th   e only question is whether 
the adjustment needed to limit long-term net liabilities to such a 
ceil-ing comes early and thus is smaller and less painful or comes 
later and thus is larger, more painful, and potentially much more 
disruptive. 
With an early adjustment, the maximum cutback in domes-
tic demand for investment, consumption, and the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit 
would be only about 4 percent of GDP. If delayed until a decade 
from now, the cutback would be about 9 percent of GDP, 
requiring much more belt-tightening even if achieved smoothly. 
Chances are that such a large adjustment would not be smooth; 
the required exchange rate adjustment would be much larger, 
and a loss of conﬁ  dence by foreign investors would likely lead to 
a larger run-up in interest rates and greater risk of recession.
3 Developing countries have typically encountered external debt problems at 
foreign debt ratios above 40 percent of GDP. In part because the government and 
corporations in the United States borrow abroad in dollars rather than foreign 
currency, the United States’ margin for error is probably higher. Australia and 
New Zealand are two industrial countries with higher net foreign liabilities (60 
and 80 percent of GDP, respectively), but their economies are much smaller rela-
tive to the world capital market.
4 It can be shown that the long-term ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP 
stabilizes at the ratio of the current account deﬁ  cit as a percent of GDP to the 
long-term average percent growth rate of nominal GDP. If real growth is 3.5 
percent and inﬂ  ation 2.5 percent, nominal growth is 6 percent, and net foreign 
liabilities stabilize at 50 percent of GDP if the current account deﬁ  cit is 3 percent 
of GDP.
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Second, as the US external deficit rises, so does the risk 
of a hard landing for the dollar, the US economy, and the 
world economy. At some point foreign investors could cut 
back on sending new capital flows to the United States, either 
because of improved returns at home or because of a grow-
ing realization that the dollar is overvalued and that they face 
prospective exchange rate losses. Any sharp cutback in foreign 
financing would risk a sharp increase in long-term US inter-
est rates, even if the Federal Reserve did not raise the short-
term (federal funds) rate it controls. Sharply higher long-term 
interest rates would depress the US housing, bond, and equity 
markets and curb investment, potentially causing a recession. 
High interest rates and US recession in turn could trigger 
global recession. Although the chances of this hard-landing 
scenario likely remain well below 50-50, they are rising as the 
deficit rises.
Third,  it  is  fundamentally  perverse  for  capital  to  be 
flowing from developing countries to the United States, as 
is now occurring, instead of the other way around. Capital 
is scarce in developing countries but abundant in the United 
States and other industrial countries. This means that rates of 
return on capital tend to be higher in developing countries, 
and hence that under normal circumstances capital will flow 
from industrial to developing countries. Such flows of capital 
contribute to faster growth in developing countries and hence 
a narrowing of the income gap between industrial and devel-
oping economies. Persistent large net flows in the opposite 
direction—i.e., to the United States—are a symptom of ill 
health in the international economy.
Fourth,  past  experience  has  shown  that  overvaluation 
of the dollar and large trade deficits lead to an increase in 
protectionist pressure in the United States. This time around 
pressure for increased protection against China in particular is 
already evident.
Fiscal and exchange raTe adjusTmenT
Two key economic changes are needed to curb the US exter-
nal deficit. First, the dollar needs to depreciate substantially 
further to make US exports more attractive to foreign buyers 
and imports less attractive to American consumers. Second, 
the US fiscal deficit needs to be cut. US domestic demand 
needs to be curbed to make room for a shift toward output 
for exports. Lower domestic demand can come from higher 
private  saving  (lower  consumption),  lower  private  invest-
ment, or a lower fiscal deficit. Because there is no reliable 
policy  instrument  to  boost  private  saving,  and  because  it 
would be undesirable to curb private investment and hence 
limit the expansion of output capacity, the appropriate policy 
is to cut the US fiscal deficit. The trade deficit is the excess 
of domestic use of resources over domestic availability, and 
the large fiscal deficit is a major reason domestic demand for 
resources exceeds domestic supply. My analysis suggests that 
overall, foreign currencies need to rise in real terms by about 
25 percent against the dollar, and the fiscal deficit needs to be 
cut from its baseline future plateau of about 3.5 percent of 
GDP to zero, in order to curb the US current account deficit 
to about 3 percent of GDP by 200.5 
I do not have specific suggestions on how to eliminate 
the fiscal deficit. I would point out, however, that federal tax 
revenue has fallen from 20 percent of GDP in 2000 to 6 
percent in 2004, largely because of tax cuts, so making the tax 
cuts permanent would greatly complicate the task of eliminat-
ing the fiscal deficit.
As for the correction of the dollar, for a time it appeared 
that market forces were on the path toward achieving that 
outcome (figure ). From its peak in February 2002 to the 
end of 2004, the dollar fell by 36 percent against the euro 
and comparably against some other European currencies and 
the Australian dollar. It also fell significantly (but to a lesser 
extent) against the Canadian dollar and the pound sterling. 
It fell more moderately against the currencies of some emerg-
ing-market economies (Korea, Chile, and Argentina). There 
was far less correction of the dollar against the Japanese yen, 
however. Moreover, the dollar did not change at all against 
the Chinese renminbi, because of China’s peg to the dollar, 
and other important East Asian economies also experienced 
minimal real appreciation (or even real depreciation) against 
the dollar, including Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia. On an overall trade-weighted basis, foreign curren-
cies rose 6.7 percent against the dollar in real terms from the 
full year 2002 as a base to end-2004.6 
This  adjustment  of  the  dollar  through  end-2004  was 
encouraging but far from complete. Because of the two-year 
lag from the exchange rate signal to the trade outcome, the 
trade balance in 2004 did not show adjustment but rather was 
at a record deficit. Nevertheless, some correction was finally in 
the pipeline. However, during the course of 2005 there was a 
serious retrogression in the adjustment process as numerous 
major currencies began to weaken once again against the dollar 
5 My book (Cline 2005) called for a 2 percent foreign real appreciation 
against the dollar from the January-May 2005 base, but the recent rise of the 
dollar increases the amount of foreign appreciation needed.
6 Federal Reserve, “Price-Adjusted Broad Dollar Index,” www.federalreserve.
gov (accessed December 8, 2005). The correction was even larger, at 9 
percent, when measured from the dollar’s peak in February 2002 to its recent 
trough in December 2004. Note that a 9 percent foreign appreciation is 
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(figure 2). The two most important nondollar currencies, the 
euro and the yen, both fell by about 6 percent in real terms 
against the dollar from end-2004 to November 5, 2005. In 
real terms this left the yen at its weakest level against the dollar 
in 20 years. The trade-weighted value of foreign currencies fell 
5.7 percent against the dollar, leaving a net real foreign appre-
ciation of only 0 percent from the 2002 base.
desirable exchange raTe realignmenT
It is possible to construct the “optimal” profile of currency 
realignments necessary for US external adjustment.7 Countries 
with relatively larger current account surpluses are the logical 
candidates to undertake the relatively larger currency appre-
ciations. It turns out that if all countries with current account 
surpluses in excess of  percent of GDP were to cut their 
7 First, the target foreign trade-weighted appreciation against the dollar needed 
to accomplish the US current account adjustment is identified. For any given 
set of exchange rate realignments, the Federal Reserve’s trade weights are 
applied to calculate the trade-weighted foreign appreciation against the dollar. 
Next, a set of target changes in current account balances of other countries is 
identified, sufficient to provide the counterpart for the target decline in the 
US current account deficit. Then the “optimal” realignment is identified as the 
one that exactly meets the identified overall target for foreign trade-weighted 
appreciation against the dollar and minimizes the difference of the resulting 
set of country current account balances from the target set of current account 
balances (Cline 2005, chapter 6).
current account surpluses by 40 percent and other countries 
also participated with modest reductions in trade balances, 
this would provide the needed counterpart of foreign adjust-
ment to mirror a reduction in the US current account deficit 
from about 6 percent of GDP to about 3 percent. It is also 
possible to postulate an overall summary relationship between 
the change in each country’s current account surplus relative 
to GDP and the change in its real exchange rate.8
On this basis, an exercise that calculates optimal real ex-
change realignments yields the results shown in table .9 The 
first column shows the desired real appreciations against the 
dollar. The target for the overall US trade-weighted foreign 
appreciation against the dollar from the 2002 base is 39 percent 
(a real depreciation of the dollar by 28 percent). Most of the 
countries show optimal appreciations around this magnitude, 
although some countries that start with exceptionally high 
current account surpluses show considerably larger optimal 
appreciation amounts.
8 The impact of exchange rate change is based on simple assumed responsive-
ness of trade to the real exchange rate, combined with the size of trade 
turnover relative to GDP.
9 The current account targets are as follows: Countries with current account 
surpluses of  percent of GDP or more reduce surpluses by 40 percent. 
Other countries reduce current account balances by 0.35 percent of GDP. As 
exceptions, Australia has no change (because its deficit is already large), and 
the European Union carries out a current account swing from +0.4 percent of 
GDP to –0.3 percent of GDP. 
Abbreviations in order:  euro area, Australia, Sweden, Russia, Switzerland, Brazil, United Kingdom, Canada, Korea, Chile, 
Argentina, India, Japan, Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Israel, Taiwan, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Mexico.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of China (Taiwan).
Figure 1  Real appreciation against the dollar, 2002 average to end-2004
Figure 1 Real appreciation against the dollar, 2002 average to end-2004 (percent)
Abbreviations in order:  euro area, Australia, Sweden, Russia, Switzerland, Brazil, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Korea, Chile, Argentina, India, Japan, Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
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It is important to note that, whereas these appreciations 
appear large bilaterally against the dollar, the magnitudes are 
much smaller in terms of overall trade-weighted appreciation 
for each currency in question (final column). The reason is that 
most of each country’s other trading partners also experience 
large appreciations against the dollar in the optimal solution. 
For example, Korea’s optimal appreciation against the dollar is 
45.6 percent from the 2002 base. Because other key trading 
partners such as Japan and China would also be appreciating, 
however,  the  overall  trade-weighted  appreciation  for  Korea 
would be only 6.4 percent. Similarly, the euro area would 
have a real appreciation (from 2002) of 44.4 percent against 
the dollar bilaterally but only 7.3 percent on a trade-weighted 
basis taking all other trading partners into account.
The table also reports the actual extent of real currency 
appreciation against the dollar from 2002 to November 5, 
2005. Although there are a few exceptions (including espe-
cially Brazil and Canada), most countries have experienced 
considerably less real appreciation than the calculated opti-
mal amount. Several countries have depreciated in real terms 
rather than appreciated against the dollar, including the key 
cases of Japan and Mexico.
The table then shows the extent of additional real appre-
ciation against the dollar from the November 5, 2005, level 
that would be required to reach the optimal amount. These 
figures are positive for all but two countries (Brazil and Cana-
da, which would instead depreciate back to the optimal levels). 
For 20 of the 25 countries plus the euro area, the needed 
remaining appreciations against the dollar are in double digits. 
For 7 of these, the desirable further appreciations against the 
dollar would be in the range of 0 to 40 percent (including the 
crucial case of the euro, at about 2 percent). For the other 3, 
the target appreciations against the dollar would be more than 
40 percent, essentially because these countries (such as China) 
did not participate in the first round of appreciation against 
the dollar from 2002 through end-2004 and also because many 
of them have unusually large current account surpluses.
Before the reversal of the dollar’s path during the course 
of 2005, the bulk of the unfinished currency appreciations 
was  concentrated  in  the  Asian  economies,  including  Japan 
but especially China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, 
which had moved their exchange rates none at all (in the first 
three cases) or minimally against the dollar.0 By late 2005, 
however, the pattern of needed further appreciation was more 
general. In particular, there was once again a need for large 
0 This is why my book (2005), which used January-May 2005 as the base, 
called for an “Asian Plaza.”
Abbreviations in order:  Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Philippines, Russia, Mexico, China, Malaysia, Korea, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Taiwan, India, Singapore, Australia, Israel, United Kingdom, Japan, euro area, 
Switzerland, Venezuela, Sweden.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of China (Taiwan).
Figure 2  Real appreciation against the dollar, end-2004 to November 15, 2005
Figure 2 Real appreciation against the dollar, end-2004 to November 2005 (percent)
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Table 1  Real appreciation against the dollar from 2002 level (percent)




Argentina 0.7 . 1.0 .
Australia . 1.9 9. .6
Brazil 9.0 60.1 –1. 7.
Canada 16.9 7.8 –8. .6
Chile 8. 7. 8.7 .
China .9 1.8 . 8.1
Colombia .7 0.8 .1 .
Euro area . 19.7 0.6 7.
Hong Kong .9 –10.7 7. 11.1
India . 9.9 1. .9
Indonesia 9.8 6.0 1. .8
Israel .9 –8. .1 .
Japan . –.6 6. 16.7
Korea .6 .1 19. 6.
Malaysia .7 –.1 60.6 1.
Mexico 1.6 –.7 19.1 .1
Philippines 7. .9 1.8 6.
Russia .6 6.7 6.1 1.
Saudi Arabia 60.7 –7.6 7.9 .
Singapore 87. –. 9.1 6.
Sweden 9.9 10.1 6.1 10.
Switzerland .7 10.0 1.6 1.9
Taiwan 7.7 –. 1.1 7.1
Thailand 7. . .6 .
United Kingdom . 1. . .1
Venezuela 1.0 –. 7.7 17.7
a. To November 5, 2005
further real appreciation of the euro against the dollar, in view 
of the sharp fallback of the euro during the course of 2005. 
Thus, against the January-May 2005 average level, the euro 
needed to appreciate only 5 percent more against the dollar to 
reach the target level, whereas from the November 5, 2005, 
base this gap had widened to 20.6 percent (Cline 2005, 242 
and table ). This means that only about half of the target real 
correction of the euro has occurred, instead of the five-sixths 
at the end of 2004.
The Plaza Agreement
There is considerable similarity between the situation today 
and  that  in  mid-985.  At  that  time,  although  the  dollar 
had begun to decline from its peak in February 985, it still 
remained seriously overvalued. On September 22, the finance 
ministers of the five largest industrial countries (G-5) met 
at the Plaza Hotel in New York and agreed on a package to 
achieve further adjustment in the dollar. The United States was 
to tighten its fiscal policy, Japan was to boost private demand 
through tax reform, and Germany was to cut taxes. All five 
countries were to carry out exchange rate intervention policies 
to reduce the value of the dollar. The results were substan-
 On the basis of interviews, Yoichi Funabashi (989, 5–2) states that the 
objective was to reduce the value of the dollar by some 0 to 2 percent in 
the short term. He also states that some $8 billion in total exchange market 
intervention was envisioned, apportioned about equally among the United 
States, Japan, and the European countries as a group. Other informed observ-
ers note, however, that some of the participants were adamant that there was 
no agreement on magnitudes, either for the change in the dollar’s value or for 
Sources: Cline (2005), IMF International Financial Statistics, and Central Bank of China (Taiwan).N u m b e r   Pb0 5 - 4    de c e m b e r   2 0 0 5
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tial. On the first day after announcement of the agreement, 
the dollar fell an average of 4.3 percent against other major 
currencies (Funabashi 989, 0). The German mark, which 
had appreciated against the dollar by 9 percent from end-
February to end-August, appreciated another 3 percent by 
end-December. The Japanese yen, which had risen 9.4 percent 
against the dollar from end-February to end-August, appreci-
ated by another 8.3 percent by end-December (International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics). Indeed, the 
package was so successful in moving the exchange rates that 
by early 987 US officials became concerned that the pace of 
the dollar’s decline might be getting out of hand.2 In Febru-
ary 987, the G-5 finance ministers met in Paris and agreed 
in the Louvre Accord to pursue intervention policies curbing 
the pace of the dollar’s decline, to be accompanied by macro-
policy adjustments.3
Plaza II
Today there is a need for an initiative comparable to the Plaza 
Agreement, probably by the G-20 group of major industrial 
and emerging-market economies, which on occasion has dealt 
with  international  financial  issues  in  recent  years.4  Those 
countries  that  have  been  intervening  in  exchange  markets 
to keep their currencies from appreciating against the dollar 
would pledge to quit doing so. Although Japan was accumu-
the amount of intervention to take place (C. Fred Bergsten, personal com-
munication, December 5, 2005).
2 According to Funabashi (989, 79), “The precipitous decline of the dollar 
since early 987 had made foreign investors in the United States more anx-
ious. The joint communiqué announced by [US Treasury Secretary] Baker and 
[Japanese Minister of Finance] Miyazawa in January and subsequent US coor-
dinated intervention to stop further dollar decline reflected the concern of the 
US Treasury over continuing decline of foreign capital inflows into the United 
States.” The approaching 988 presidential election likely also contributed to 
US officials’ concern about the dollar’s decline getting out of hand.
3 The Louvre Accord “secretly established a narrow intervention grid for the 
currencies of the Group of Seven countries” (Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry 999). 
Funabashi (989, 86) states that the agreement set the February 20, 987, 
rates of the German mark and yen against the dollar as the base and provided 
for voluntary intervention as the rates approached a “first line of defense” at ± 
2.5 percent around these base rates, and for obligatory consultation on policy 
adjustments once the deviations reached 5 percent. The public statement of 
the accord referred simply to stabilization of the dollar “around the current 
levels.” The Louvre Accord also involved German and Japanese pledges to 
implement economic stimulus through tax cuts (Funabashi 989, 78–80).
4 Formed in 999, the G-20 includes finance ministers and central bank 
governors of 9 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus the 
European Union represented by the Council presidency and the president of 
the European Central Bank. For the case supporting use of the G-20 rather 
than G-7 to deal with international imbalances, see Bergsten (forthcoming).
lating dollar reserves massively in most of 2002 through early 
2004, it has not done so since March 2004, and the European 
Central Bank has largely refrained from intervening to limit 
the rise of the euro (a central reason why the euro rose sharply 
against the dollar in 2002–04, whereas the yen rose much 
less). However, the Bank of Japan and the European Central 
Bank could undertake sales of dollar reserves as part of the 
overall package, and the United States could similarly under-
take purchases of euros, yen, and perhaps other currencies.
In principle, each country would persist in this approach 
until its exchange rate against the dollar had risen by a broad 
agreed  range.  The  International  Monetary  Fund  could  be 
asked to provide technical support in confirming appropri-
ate ranges for realignment of exchange rates for consistency 
with US adjustments and individual country circumstances. 
On the basis of table , it would be appropriate to specify 
perhaps three tiers of countries. The first tier would include 
those with currencies that appropriately would rise some 40 
percent or more against the dollar; a second tier, currencies 
that should rise by 5 to 40 percent against the dollar; and 
in a third tier, there would be no specific initiative unless the 
currency began to fall against the dollar. A reasonable time 
horizon for phasing in this adjustment would be three years. 
On the basis of table , 3 countries would be in the top tier, 
including the key cases of China and Japan. Six currencies 
would be in the second tier, including the important cases of 
the euro, the Korean won, the Mexican peso, and the pound 
sterling. Again, however, even for most of the countries in the 
top tier, the overall trade-weighted real exchange rate move-
ments would be far more moderate, at less than 0 percent for 
China and 5 percent for Japan. The euro area, in the inter-
mediate tier, would also have a cumulative real trade-weighted 
appreciation of only about 7 percent from the 2002 base.
The United States would carry out its part of the adjust-
ment process by setting forth credible plans for eliminating 
the fiscal deficit over the next five years. The economic reason 
for such a commitment is that an initial round of dollar depre-
ciation without fiscal adjustment would tend to be frustrated 
because the resulting boost to US output with no curb in 
domestic demand would generate inflationary pressure, induce 
monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve, boost interest 
 
There is a need for an initiative comparable 
to the Plaza Agreement, probably by 
the G-20 group of major industrial and 
emerging-market economies. . . .N u m b e r   Pb0 5 - 4   de c e m b e r   2 0 0 5
7
rates, and as a result tend to bid the dollar back up. In terms 
of political economy, a US commitment to eliminate its fiscal 
deficit  would  counter  countries’  otherwise  understandable 
reaction against being asked to take action to solve a problem 
rooted in flawed US economic policies.
The  need  for  a  coordinated  package  along  the  lines 
of this Plaza II Agreement is especially great for a number 
of developing countries that have kept their exchange rates 
closely  tied  to  the  dollar,  either  in  exchange  rate  pegs  (as 
pursued formally until recently by China and Malaysia and 
still by Hong Kong—and in practice still by China as well) or 
through aggressive exchange rate intervention and accumula-
tion of reserves to limit appreciation of their currencies (in 
many other developing and newly industrialized countries, as 
well as Japan). 
Any individual developing country following a managed 
flexible  exchange  rate  regime  (a  “dirty  float”)  could  be 
concerned  about  loss  of  competitiveness  if  its  government 
were to allow its exchange rate to appreciate against those of 
its peers. If a large number of countries appreciate against the 
dollar  in  a  coordinated  manner,  in  contrast,  no  individual 
country faces the penalty of making its exports uncompetitive 
against alternative suppliers. This is known as the prisoner’s 
dilemma, which collective action resolves. This problem is at 
the heart of the case for a coordinated Plaza II designed to 
marshal coordinated action by many countries that otherwise 
have strong incentives individually to keep their currencies 
from rising against the dollar.
In  addition  to  the  notable  cases  of  the  Japanese  yen, 
Chinese renminbi, and a number of East Asian currencies, 
the euro is now substantially undervalued against the dollar. 
The euro is the single most important currency in the world 
economy after the dollar, and the euro-area economy must 
play an important role in the adjustment needed abroad as 
the counterpart of the reduction needed in the US current 
account deficit. As suggested above, the euro’s value could 
appropriately rise some 20 percent against the dollar as part 
of global exchange rate realignments. The optimal exchange 
rate exercise calls for a downswing in the euro-area current 
account balance by $64 billion, about the same as the correc-
tion  of  $68  billion  envisioned  for  Japan’s  current  account 
(Cline 2005, 250). The sharp decline of the euro during 2005 
means that the currency is far from being on track to achieve 
this outcome.
Unlike in many East Asian economies, however, in the 
euro area the problem is not that intervention and reserve 
buildups are thwarting market forces. Instead, market forces 
are now driving the currency down in response to such influ-
ences as the rise in US interest rates, the prolonged growth gap 
between Europe and the United States, and political shocks 
in Europe (rejection of the EU constitution, political uncer-
tainty in Germany, and ethnic rioting in France). Under these 
circumstances, there is a case for active exchange market inter-
vention to guide the euro back toward a level consistent with 
accomplishing the part of the international adjustment task 
that would appropriately be borne by the euro-area economy. 
Such action would be in Europe’s long-term interest because 
otherwise, in the absence of a coordinated Plaza II, the even-
tual pressures associated with an ever-widening US current 
account deficit could trigger a sharp upsurge in the euro, not 
only against the dollar but also against many other currencies 
held  down  by  wrong-direction  intervention.  The  euro-area 
economy could then wind up bearing a disproportionate share 
of the burden of foreign adjustment.5
counTerargumenTs
There are three popular arguments against the Plaza II strat-
egy, none of which in my view withstands scrutiny. The first 
is simply that the value of the exchange rate and the size of 
the current account deficit are not matters for policy but for 
the market to determine. Thus, in November 2005 retiring 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stated:
A  nation’s  current  account  balance  thus  is  essentially  a 
market phenomenon that is not readily subject to rebal-
ance by targeting one or more policy variables such as the 
exchange rate. . . . I doubt . . . whether, given the current 
size of global financial markets, locking together two major 
currencies such as the dollar and the euro is feasible any 
longer. Over time, the required large domestic adjustments 
would be quite unlikely to be accepted by the majority of 
the residents of either the United States or those of the 
euro area.
Leaving the dollar’s value strictly to “market forces” was 
also the mantra before the first Plaza, as the first Reagan admin-
istration pursued what was then called “benign neglect” of the 
dollar’s inexorable rise and the resulting rise in the trade gap. It 
was only the severe intensification of protectionist pressures in 
Congress that prompted the new team at the Treasury Depart-
ment in the second Reagan administration to pursue a G-5 
pact on exchange rate realignment. As suggested by the move 
of the dollar in the wrong direction in 2005, market forces 
with no guidance cannot always be counted upon to work 
in an equilibrating manner (as is even more evident in the 
recent stock market bubble and, arguably, real estate bubble). 
5 This risk is increasingly recognized in Europe (Ahearne and von Hagen 
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An array of major trading nations that patently are not allow-
ing market forces to work are compounding the problem by 
building up larger and larger foreign exchange reserves rather 
than allowing the market to appreciate their currencies (table 
2).  This  group  included  Japan  until  early  2004  and  today 
includes most of the East Asian emerging-market economies. 
More broadly, the central question is whether policymakers 
should sit idly by if the market is providing the US economy 
with more than enough rope to hang itself.
The second counterargument is that a major US fiscal 
correction and decline in the dollar would impose a severe 
recessionary shock on the rest of the world economy.6 This 
argument  ignores  the  fact  that  the  longer  the  imbalance 
persists and the wider it becomes, the greater will be the size 
of the inevitable adjustment and hence its impact on the rest 
of the world. A cutback of 3 to 4 percent of US GDP in the 
external deficit, spread over three to five years, would involve 
fully manageable adjustment magnitudes for the rest of the 
world. US GDP is about one-fourth of the world total, so 
the reduction in demand for the rest of the world would be 
about  percent of GDP, corresponding to about .5 percent 
after taking into account terms-of-trade effects. Spread over 
three years this amount would not be so large as to provoke a 
recessionary shock. 
Other countries would need to take domestic expansion-
ary measures (fiscal, monetary, and ideally structural reform as 
well) to offset fully the reduction in demand stemming from 
the lower net exports associated with US external adjustment. 
A  new  Plaza  Agreement  would  thus  usefully  include  the 
6 Richard Cooper (2005) is one who has made this argument.
outlines of such measures, tailored as appropriate to the major 
economies. Even if expansionary measures abroad were not 
adopted, however, the direct effect of the US external adjust-
ment would not thrust the rest of the world economy into 
recession; rather, it would only be large enough to trim the 
pace of rest-of-world growth temporarily, by perhaps half a 
percentage point annually over three years. But if adjustment 
were delayed until it becomes much larger, the chances of a 
recessionary shock would rise substantially.
The third counterargument is that not much impact on 
the current account can be expected from US fiscal adjust-
ment.  This  remarkable  recent  argument,  espoused  surpris-
ingly  by  several  key  figures  in  the  US  Federal  Reserve,  is 
highly questionable.7 It is, of course, a complete reversal of 
the traditional macroeconomic policy mantra of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) in its dealings with developing 
countries that face external current account difficulties. Fiscal 
adjustment is such a standard part of the policy advice given 
to such countries that some have suggested that IMF stands 
for “It’s Mostly Fiscal.” 
7 Most recently, Greenspan (2005) stated: “. . . a discretionary reduction in 
our federal budget deficit would work toward narrowing the current account 
deficit but, if history is any judge, to an uncertain and possibly small extent.” 
Similarly, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson (2005) not only 
cites a Federal Reserve model estimate showing that a dollar in fiscal adjust-
ment only cuts the trade deficit by 20 cents but also his actual application of 
the model run over a long enough period finds that the cut is only 5 cents. The 
basic problem is that, as designed, such models set loose indirect, offsetting 
forces that eventually dampen or negate the original shock, but their applica-
tion of the normal operation of such forces is inappropriate when the “shock” 
is a correction of an initial fiscal disequilibrium rather than a disturbance of 
fiscal equilibrium (Cline 2005,  20).
Table 2  External reserves of selected economies at end of period, 2000–July 2005 
(billions of dollars)
country/region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005a
Euro area 60.0 . 66.1 .8 .0 1.
Japan . 97. 6. 666. 8.6 89.0
China 168. 16.9 9.1 10. 61. 71.6
Hong Kong 107. 111. 111.9 118.7 1. 11.7
India 8. 6. 68. 99.8 17.0 16.
Korea 9.9 10.0 11. 1.7 198.6 0.
Malaysia 9. 0.6 . .7 66. 78.
Singapore 80.0 7.6 8.1 96.0 11.0 11.6
Taiwan 107.1 1.1 16. 07.9 .0 .9
Mexico . .9 0.6 9.1 6.0 66.
a. End-July, except for Taiwan (June).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.N u m b e r   Pb0 5 - 4   de c e m b e r   2 0 0 5
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The Fund has both economic logic and decades of inter-
national policy practice on its side. There is an iron law of 
national accounts that states that the trade deficit equals the 
fiscal deficit plus the excess of private investment over private 
saving. Reducing the fiscal deficit may not guarantee an equal 
reduction in the trade deficit, but those who argue that it will 
do little at all must explain why reducing the fiscal deficit 
would cause a fully offsetting rise in private investment or 
a reduction in private saving. Although there is a theory of 
“Ricardian equivalence” that says households will cut saving if 
the government cuts its deficit because they no longer need to 
set aside as much against inevitable future tax increases, this 
theory has been irrelevant in the United States in recent years, 
when  private  saving  fell  from  about  8  percent  of  personal 
disposable income to zero even as the fiscal deficit was widen-
ing. Not only is this the wrong sign for Ricardian equivalence, 
but this theory now would also require households to plunge 
into deep negative annual saving if the government corrected 
its fiscal deficit. In short, the argument that fiscal adjustment 
would do little to help external adjustment is not only implau-
sible, it is at best a recipe for policy paralysis in the face of 
widening external deficits and at worst a license for the federal 
government to pursue ever larger fiscal deficits with little care 
for external balance consequences.
conclusion
The United States is running an increasing risk by allowing 
its external current account deficit to head ever higher, past 
levels already historically unprecedented for the United States 
and most other industrial countries. A credible program to 
eliminate the fiscal deficit by 200 combined with a Plaza II 
Agreement to achieve appreciation of a wide array of foreign 
currencies against the dollar would provide a sound basis for 
arresting this trend and bringing the external deficit back to a 
range of about 3 percent of GDP, which would be consistent 
with keeping the eventual ratio of net foreign liabilities to 
GDP at a prudent ceiling of about 50 percent.8
8 Tokyo or Shanghai could be appropriate venues for an “Okura” or “Grand 
Even without a formal Plaza II, US policymakers should 
begin to press foreign central banks much more widely to desist 
from accumulating additional reserves. US authorities should 
greatly expand their focus to include most of the East Asian 
exchange rates rather than concentrating solely on the Chinese 
renminbi, as they have done so far. In principle, central banks 
should stop accumulating reserves until their currencies are 
on a path toward the type of corrections against the dollar 
indicated above.
A Plaza II would greatly help in this process for three 
reasons. First, it would resolve the “prisoner’s dilemma” for 
major  developing  and  newly  industrialized  economies,  in 
which each country acting in isolation fears loss of competi-
tiveness. Second, it would provide a framework for coordi-
nated intervention in exchange markets by major industrial 
economies (dollar sales by the European Central Bank and 
Bank of Japan and purchases of euros, yen, and possibly other 
currencies  by  the  Federal  Reserve).  Third,  by  including  a 
program for US fiscal adjustment, it would assure countries 
allowing their currencies to rise that the United States, too, 
was carrying out the needed policy corrections. 
Hyatt” Agreement, respectively. The Plaza in New York is no longer a hotel.
 
. . . the central question is whether 
policymakers should sit idly by if the 
market is providing the US economy with 
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